Wednesday, June 6, 2007

INTERROGATORIES FOR PROSECUTOR FITZGERALD

I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Jr. has been convicted and sentenced. The debate rages over the propriety of the prosecution, the severity of the sentence and the probability of a pardon. I wince at those who belittle the charges of perjury and obstruction of justice. But I do agree that the failure to indict as to the underlying charge of "outing" Valerie Plame as a CIA operative requires some explanation.

Federal grand jury presentments are no longer in favor for reasons too complicated to discuss here, but in view of the length and expense of this investigation and the public interest involved, it would seem that the special prosecutor should issue some statement or report as to the result of that investigation, unless there is some prohibition against his doing so. In view of the obvious thoroughness of Mr. Fitzgerald's investigation, he, more than anyone else, has the knowledge of what actually transpired. Here are some of the questions that should be answered:

1. Was a crime committed in the outing of Valerie Plame Wilson? If so, why was no one indicted?

2. If not, what elements were missing?

a. Is it because she was not "covert" as many have claimed?

b. Is it because of the geographic location of her station?

c. Is it because of some time period?

d. What other reasons were there for not prosecuting?

3. Who were the persons responsible for the disclosure of the information regarding her?

4. Was an agreement reached between the prosecution and Robert Novak? If so, what were the terms?

5. Did the prosecutor make any recommendations or referrals for actions (other than criminal) such as disciplinary, to be taken against any individuals other than Mr. Libby, and if so who and what? Would he recommend any now?

Some of these matters were or may have been presented during the course of the Libby trial and reported in the media. However, the country deserves the details in a formal presentation from the official in charge, when it appears that the power of the administration was utilized and abused for the sole purpose of discrediting a critic on an issue relevant to our going to war against another country.

Wednesday, May 30, 2007

THE DISCRIMINATION HISTORY DEFENSE

Based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear, an employer that is currently practicing pay discrimination can defend against a victim's claim by proving that it had engaged in such discrimination for a long period of time. In other words, incredibly if an employer can demonstrate that it had a history of pay discrimination that was initiated and existed more than 180 days before the employee filed her claim, then the claim will be barred. I visualize this future courtroom scenario:

Plaintiff's Counsel: Your honor, the moment my client discovered that she was being discriminated against in respect to her pay, she immediately filed the appropriate claim and this lawsuit.

Defense Counsel: Your Honor, the Ledbetter decision provides an absolute defense to this action. My client has a long history of discrimination, and its credo is never to pay women, African-Americans or Hispanics what it pays to white males for the same work or position. Since the discrimination begins the day they are hired and we have employed the plaintiff and these other employees for years, although the disparity continues to this day, this complaint must be dismissed, because more than 180 days has elapsed since we started discriminating against her.

The Court: Counsel, in accordance with the Ledbetter case, since you have established that your client has had a long history of discrimination, the motion to dismiss will be granted.

The Court has concluded that the "unlawful employment practice" occurs when the salary is first fixed and that the required claim must be made within 180 days thereafter. Apparently this time line applies "even if the effects of the initial discriminatory act were not immediately apparent to the worker and even if they continue to the present day". (NYTimes 5/30/07) Putting aside the practical problems faced by an employee in attempting to learn about the pay disparity, and the hesitancy one might have to sue despite that knowledge, how can its continuance not be an "unlawful employment practice"?

Supporters of the opinion point out that it eliminates stale pay claims. But this decision does not deal with how far back the claim may go, but rather whether it reaches the threshold of allowing the claim at all. It is inconceivable to me that an employer can be shielded from a continuing pay discrimination claim solely on the grounds that the discrimination has been ongoing for a long time, but that is exactly what this decision holds. A history of discrimination constitutes a defense to a discrimination claim!

Thursday, May 24, 2007

WHAT A DIFFERENCE A DAY MAKES

In a previous post (Punitive Damages v. The Death Penalty 3/22/07) I discussed the difficulty I thought the Supreme Court would have reconciling its decision that a jury in awarding punitive damages could not consider prior harm to identifiable victims, while a jury in a death penalty case could consider the possible (and unlikely) effect upon unknown persons. The prosecutor in the Weaver case, in urging the death penalty, had argued to the jury in emotional terms that they should "send a message" to deter others. I think such an argument is totally inappropriate and agree with the Eighth Circuit that it is "unfairly inflammatory" and should warrant reversal.

The dissent from the per curiam opinion which dismissed the writ of certiorari on the grounds that it was improvidently granted, is more interesting in what it says about the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) than what it says about the propriety of the prosecutor's closing. Although the history of the matter is somewhat convoluted, apparently everyone agrees that the District Court improperly dismissed the defendant's habeas petition on the ground that he failed to exhaust his remedies, because he expressed his intention to apply for certiorari from the Supreme Court. His original petition was filed pre-ADEPA, but he re-filed after its adoption.

Not without considerable justification, the dissent argues that the matter should have been decided on the merits as to whether or not the Eighth Circuit had exceeded its authority under the Act in setting aside the capital sentence. However, what caught my attention was the following question posed by the dissent: "Is what happened here any less rational, any less fair****than the random fact that one petitioner's habeas action was filed a day before AEDPA's effective date, and another petitioner's could not be filed until one day after?" What a difference a day makes! The logic is compelling, but the consequences of the statute are chilling.

Further logic suggests that what would have been grounds to reverse the imposition of the death penalty on one day might be gone the next. The dissent suggests that the Court's failure to deal with the matter on the merits causes harm by requiring the State of Missouri to try the defendant again after two decades, and "The greatest harm is done to the AEDPA, since dismissing the writ of certiorari leaves the grossly erroneous precedent on the books".

But could it be that the greater harm comes from the Act itself which may serve to deprive a person sentenced to death of grounds for reversal which otherwise would be recognized, but for the more stringent standard of review mandated by AEDPA. Many, who heretofore would have avoided the death penalty, will now face it ----solely by act of Congress. Here today; gone tomorrow.

Saturday, May 19, 2007

WHAT DO ALBERTO GONZALEZ AND A CHICAGO DIVORCE LAWYER HAVE IN COMMON?

They both have demeaned the legal profession. A huge billboard in Chicago's nightclub district proclaims: "Life's short. Get a divorce" It features photographs of "a sexy, scantily clad woman on one side and a buff, bare-chested man on the other". (NYTimes 5/13/07) No matter what the message or the motive of the messenger, no one can dispute the right of the lawyer to offer her wares in this fashion. It has met with considerable success. As with the Attorney General, apparently all things are to be judged by whether or not they are working, not whether they are right or wrong. Illegal wiretapping, secret prisons, torture, unlawful detentions, political firings of U.S. attorneys, suspension of habeas corpus, rejection of the Geneva Convention, and undoubtedly a host of other conduct yet to be revealed (such as a coercive hospital visit to the previous Attorney General seeking approval of an illegal wiretapping scheme) are all justified on the basis that no further attacks have occured since 9/11. Ergo, these tactics, like the billboard poster, are working, The only difference being that encouraging divorce is not illegal or unconstitutional, although in this administration it might be one day.

As to the firings of the U.S. attorneys, nothing infuriates me more than the party line that these are political appointments, and the President, as did President Clinton, can replace them all. Yes, these appointments are political as are those to the courts, but once appointed, U.S. Attorneys, Judges and Justices cease to be political agents. To do otherwise violates their oath of office. Prosecutors should not be dismissed for pursuing criminal conduct by members of the party in power or failing to pursue actions for the sole purpose of embarrassing the opposition and affecting the outcome of elections. Justice is not meant to be used as a political weapon.

So look for a billboard with that infamous picture of the hooded prisoner at Abu Ghraib on one side and a smiling picture of the Attorney General on the other saying: "Stop Terror. Torture Works", because there is little that the current Attorney General does not have in common with the sleazy divorce lawyer.

Tuesday, May 8, 2007

A JUDGE STRIKES BACK

I have followed with some interest the libel suit instituted by a Massachusetts judge against the Boston Herald, which resulted in a $2 million verdict against the newspaper and was recently upheld. (NYTimes 5/8/07) I remember being outraged when I read that the judge, among other reported misconduct, had said about a rape victim: "She's 14. She got raped. Tell her to get over it." If true, it was inconceivable to me that such a person could be permitted to continue serving on the court. Apparently the jury found that it was not true and rendered its verdict accordingly.

What makes this case unusual, is that judges who are criticized rarely have the opportunity to respond in any fashion. Usually, they must remain silent no matter how unfair, unjust or untrue the accusations. I am totally in favor of robust analysis and criticism of judicial opinions and conduct, but the judge's inability to respond should place an enhanced burden on the critic to be accurate and fair.

I strongly believe this, not so much to protect the judge's sensibilities, but to maintain the public's confidence in the judiciary. I have spoken out for years about my concern that this constant barrage against judges, the mantra of "activist", "liberal", "soft-on-crime" and "legislating from the bench", all serve to erode the public's perception of and confidence in the judiciary. These labels which may produce some immediate political gain, in the long run will harm our judicial system if it causes the people to cease to believe in it.

Saturday, May 5, 2007

SUSPECTED TERRORISTS CAN BE IMPRISONED BUT NOT DENIED GUNS

I find it ironic, but not surprising, that the NRA opposes a bill that would prohibit suspected terrorists from buying firearms. (AP 5/5/07) I should disclose that I have never seen a gun control bill that I didn't like. I agree with the slogan that: "Guns Don't Kill People; People Kill People", but call me crazy, I think a person who did not have a gun would have difficulty shooting anybody.

But the tens of thousands of deaths every year and the slaughter of innocents by guns doesn't seem to deter the trend of having every American citizen packin'. "A Gun in Every Pocket" is reminiscent of the old slogan: "A Chicken in Every Pot", except there the goal was to feed all people, rather than improve their chances of killing others or being killed.

Having disclosed my bias, the irony that I see is the supposition (maybe incorrect) that many, if not most, of the members of the NRA have no difficulty with the unfettered discretion of the President in detaining "suspected terrorists" indefinitely and denying them many traditional rights. Apparently it is acceptable to incarcerate them on suspicion, but not deprive them of their right to bear arms.

Of course, the ultimate irony may occur when one of those "activist, liberal, soft-on-crime, legislating judges" that conservatives are always complaining about, comes along and agrees with them and declares the statute unconstitutional on the same grounds that they oppose it.

Friday, May 4, 2007

BLINDING JUSTICE

The Ohio Supreme Court (NYTimes 5/3/07) "overturned a law that required a prosecutor's consent to allow felons who had pleaded guilty to seek DNA tests that could prove their innocence". The Times reports that other states have similar legislation. We know that innocent persons are convicted of crimes, and there is probably an even larger number of those who plead guilty to crimes that they did not commit----many in fear of going to trial and receiving a much longer sentence than the plea bargain provides. (Which may explain the reduction in criminal trials reported by Adam Liptak NYTimes 4/30/07.) There is no way to calculate how many such cases exist because the same fear precludes subsequent challenges.

But what is difficult to understand is why a state legislature would enact such a statute even if only one innocent person entered a guilty plea. The proffered justification for the denial is that it interferes with the peace of mind of the victim "if a convict sought a hearing on DNA tests". It is difficult to envision how a DNA test would involve the victim, but even if it did, one would think that a victim would prefer to be inconvenienced rather than run the risk of having an innocent person remain in prison while the real criminal roamed free.

The Ohio Supreme Court wisely overturned the legislation on the ground that it violated the separation of powers and declared that the legislature"may not impede the judiciary in its province to determine guilt in a criminal matter". We should be searching for ways to ease the plight of innocent persons confined for crimes they did not commit, no matter how small the number may be, rather than impose barriers to their exoneration.

Sunday, April 29, 2007

MILEAGE POINTS FOR JAIL UPGRADES?

Today's New York Times 4/29/07) reports that minor crime offenders can obtain "pay-to-stay upgrades" at a number of city jails in California. The accommodations ranging from $75 to $127 per day are cleaner and safer and allow for the right to bring certain electronics as contrasted with the those provided the non-paying clientele. The system is justified by the income it generates and sells itself to prospects on the basis "that you are isolated and you don't have to expose yourself to the traditional county system." You don't enter the jail by the same means as the non-paying guests. In other words, even though you have been adjudged a criminal, you don't have to be treated as one, if you can afford it.

Rubin "Hurricane" Carter describes life in prison as being locked in "an iron cage**** I was a prisoner, a number, ******Not a person. Not a human being. But a body to be counted fifteen or twenty times a day." Of course, his confinement followed convictions for murder, not some minor offense. But it is important to recognize the harshness of any jail or prison time and that some offenders should be treated differently--should be isolated from the repeat and violent offenders. However, that selection and segregation should not depend upon the wealth of the offender. The concept is valid but the criterion is not. Just because a criminal can afford to be a frequent flier should not result in a jail upgrade.

Tuesday, April 17, 2007

NATIONAL REVIEW RE-TRASHS ME

Someone forwarded me an article which recently appeared in the highly respected National Review (Online). It was a re-trashing of me, based upon an opinion that I had written while on the United States District Court some 15 years ago in the Haines case. Also, I haven't served as a judge for 11 years. What a proud moment in journalism that must be! But in all fairness, putting aside the venom in the article, most of it is true. I was criticized by the Court of Appeals, reversed and was removed from the case, and nonetheless, despite my obvious shortcomings was nominated and confirmed for a seat on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

The language which prompted my dismissal from the case (after several failed tries by the tobacco defendants) was the following:

"All too often in the choice between the physical health of consumers and the financial well-being of business, concealment is chosen over disclosure, sales over safety and money over morality. Who are these persons who knowingly and secretly decide to put the buying public at risk solely for the purpose of making profits and who believe that illness and death of consumers is an appropriate cost of their own prosperity!

As the following facts disclose, although there may be some rising pretenders to the throne, the tobacco industry may be the king of concealment and disinformation."

At my Senate confirmation hearing, I even conceded that if given the opportunity I would probably take that language back if I could (although convinced then and now of its accuracy), because I recognized that despite its truth, it might not be appropriate language for a court opinion, and certainly not, if it was going to cause my removal from cases that I had presided over for almost 10 years.

But in retrospect, strangely enough, though criticized, reversed and causing my removal, I think the decision in the Haines was probably the most important decision of my career. I was informed by Dr. David Kessler that it launched the FDA's investigation into tobacco; a TV documentary suggested that it was the basis of the federal government's case against the industry, and many lawyers representing the states in their claims against the industry (resulting in the largest settlement in history) credit my decision with being the catalyst for their suits.

My decision is characterized by NR as a historical example of "liberal judicial activism". The Court of Appeals found it to be wrong, and I agree with its decision in every respect, except the basis for my removal. But I fail to see what makes it either "liberal" or "activist", unless rulings against the tobacco industry automatically fall under those labels. Also, fairness might have prompted NR to include the following quote from the appellate opinion---although admittedly inserted to soften the blow of my removal:

The district judge in this case had been a distinguished member of the federal judiciary for almost 15 years and is no stranger to this court; he is well known and respected for his magnificent abilities and outstanding jurisprudential and judicial temperament. On the basis of our collective experience, we would not agree that he is incapable of discharging his judicial duties free from bias or prejudice.****

Finally, the judge who authored that opinion removing me from the case was the staunchest supporter of my subsequent nomination to be a member of the very court upon which he served. Surely NR can find some active judges engaged in activism. If not, they might want to review the opinions of the Rehnquist Court which declared unconstitutional more acts of Congress than any Supreme Court in history.

Thursday, April 12, 2007

MALPRACTICE MEANS NOT SAYING YOU'RE SORRY

I learned for the first time today that there are laws in many states prohibiting the use of a doctor's apology as an admission in a malpractice claim against the doctor. (AP, R.I. 4/12/07) According to the report, at least 28 states already have the legislation and 8 other states are considering adopting it. Furthermore, the article reveals that insurers warn doctors against the dangers of apologizing or using words such as "error", "mistake", "fault", or "negligence" in talking to their patients.

Is this what our legal system has wrought? Have we so intimidated the medical profession that its members fear admitting their mistakes and offering to correct them; that we need legislation to protect them against the consequences of apologizing? Concededly, doctors are faced with baseless malpractice claims, exorbitant insurance premiums, the expenditure of time and emotion in defending suits and the possibility that their mere threat causes them to practice and prescribe in a manner that they would not do otherwise.

But likewise, there are legitimate malpractice claims. Do we want our medical profession to be more concerned with potential liability than being candid and caring for the health and well-being of their patients. And if morality and principle do not suffice, practically, who is more likely to be sued, the doctor who admits his mistake to the patient and offers to correct it or the doctor who conceals and avoids confessing the error.

I had a doctor for years who had a sign in his waiting room: I HAVE NO INSURANCE. IF YOU PLAN TO SUE ME, PLEASE GO ELSEWHERE. If he made a mistake, I know he would tell me, because he was more concerned with my health than his liability. If we in the legal profession have reversed that then I hope none of us ever gets sick.