The Supreme Court has decided (in the case of Philip Morris USA v. Williams) that the due process clause prohibits calculating punitive damages based upon harm caused to strangers to the litigation. The closeness of the vote reflects that there are valid arguments on both sides of this issue.
Let us assume that someone has been killed as the result of a defective tire. In the first law suit, the manufacturer learns that the tire is defective. Nonetheless, it continues to manufacture the tire and 100 more persons are killed as a result. Should not the company suffer a greater punishment with each new death? The more deaths; the more egregious the conduct to be punished. Therefore, it would be wrong not to consider harm to others so long as there was adequate proof of the prior deaths and their cause. The purpose of punitive damages is to punish past and deter future wrongful conduct. The continuance of that outrageous conduct in the face of knowledge as to its harmful consequences should certainly serve as one of the bases for calculating punitive damages. The prior conduct and record of a criminal defendant is considered in deciding the severity of punishment, even though the defendant may have already suffered punishment for those prior crimes. Why should it be any different in meting out punishment in a civil matter in which punitive damages are warranted?
But now let us assume that at several trials brought on behalf of those who have died from the defective tire, each jury is told about the 100 deaths as a basis for calculating punitive damages. Each then would be punishing the manufacture for the same 100 deaths. Therefore, it would be wrong to consider harm to others if it resulted in repetitive punitive damage awards for the same conduct and harm.
I wrestled with this very issue in 1989 in the case of Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Co., 705 F. Supp. 1053, and concluded that multiple awards of punitive damages based upon injuries to others violated the due process clause, the only decision I ever made that was praised by the Wall Street Journal. Despite that praise, I eventually and unilaterally withdrew the decision, concluding that I did not have the power or authority to effectuate such a decision---that it required the Supreme Court or the Congress to do so. The Supreme Court has now spoken, but I continue to have the same concerns expressed above. The ability of citizens to punish others for outrageous conduct in instances in which government cannot or will not is a power worth preserving, but it is essential that guidelines be established so as to lead courts through this current quagmire.
Friday, February 23, 2007
Saturday, February 17, 2007
COURT TV OR NOT TO BE
One of the fans of my blog (maybe the only one) suggested that I write about the Anna Nicole Smith case, and I responded that I could not conceive that there was anything left to say about it, but I was wrong. Justice Anthony Kennedy recently appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee making the repeated and wholly justified (and usually ignored) plea for greater compensation for federal judges. He was diverted from his topic by Senator Specter who again raised the spectre of televising Supreme Court arguments.
Over the years I have been ambivalent about the televising of court proceedings. I recognize the usual arguments about the potential effect upon witnesses, jurors and possibly judges, but I have seen studies that suggest that the presence of the courtroom camera is soon forgotten and its effect minimal. On the other hand, although not a regular watcher, I have caught glimpses of the TV judges---rude, impolite, snide and impatient, rendering decisions from the hip, and fear that the public has come to conflate them with our real judicial system.
I can certainly understand Senator Specter's position. Wouldn't it have been marvelous for the country to see and hear live the arguments in a case that decided who would be President of the United States? Justice Kennedy is properly concerned about the single sound bite at the end of a session, but doesn't that same risk exist with the print media? And at the trial level, the country should be able to observe the "Scooter" Libby trial, one that so clearly demonstrates the workings of the current administration. But I also thought that showing the O.J. Simpson trial was the right decision, so that when he was convicted, the African-American community would have had the opportunity to observe the fairness of the trial.
Televising court proceedings might also serve to deter the real judges who are rude, arrogant and impatient and at the same time demonstrate the respect and fairness usually displayed by most judges serving throughout this country. I have always believed that how the litigants and lawyers are treated is as important as the decision reached. Every case will have its losers. How they feel about their treatment during the process is the true test of the system.
And that brings me back to where I started---the Anna Nicole Smith case. All of the positives things that I thought televised court proceedings might bring to educate the public and engender respect for our judicial system were eradicated watching the Florida proceeding, which was to determine where Ms. Smith was to be buried. I don't doubt the Florida judge's good intentions, but I thought that I was watching a poker game in someone's basement. Lawyers were arguing directly with each other. Witnesses were testifying from a variety of chairs or standing. It was difficult to tell who were the witnesses and who were the lawyers. The judge, despite his oft repeated desire to maintain the dignity of the deceased and the proceeding, seem to do everything to accomplish the opposite while expanding the scope of the proceedings well beyond the issue presented and probably beyond his jurisdiction as well. I suspect to the public this case is already part fact and part fiction, but for the dignity of our court system, I would love to see that TV plug pulled.
Over the years I have been ambivalent about the televising of court proceedings. I recognize the usual arguments about the potential effect upon witnesses, jurors and possibly judges, but I have seen studies that suggest that the presence of the courtroom camera is soon forgotten and its effect minimal. On the other hand, although not a regular watcher, I have caught glimpses of the TV judges---rude, impolite, snide and impatient, rendering decisions from the hip, and fear that the public has come to conflate them with our real judicial system.
I can certainly understand Senator Specter's position. Wouldn't it have been marvelous for the country to see and hear live the arguments in a case that decided who would be President of the United States? Justice Kennedy is properly concerned about the single sound bite at the end of a session, but doesn't that same risk exist with the print media? And at the trial level, the country should be able to observe the "Scooter" Libby trial, one that so clearly demonstrates the workings of the current administration. But I also thought that showing the O.J. Simpson trial was the right decision, so that when he was convicted, the African-American community would have had the opportunity to observe the fairness of the trial.
Televising court proceedings might also serve to deter the real judges who are rude, arrogant and impatient and at the same time demonstrate the respect and fairness usually displayed by most judges serving throughout this country. I have always believed that how the litigants and lawyers are treated is as important as the decision reached. Every case will have its losers. How they feel about their treatment during the process is the true test of the system.
And that brings me back to where I started---the Anna Nicole Smith case. All of the positives things that I thought televised court proceedings might bring to educate the public and engender respect for our judicial system were eradicated watching the Florida proceeding, which was to determine where Ms. Smith was to be buried. I don't doubt the Florida judge's good intentions, but I thought that I was watching a poker game in someone's basement. Lawyers were arguing directly with each other. Witnesses were testifying from a variety of chairs or standing. It was difficult to tell who were the witnesses and who were the lawyers. The judge, despite his oft repeated desire to maintain the dignity of the deceased and the proceeding, seem to do everything to accomplish the opposite while expanding the scope of the proceedings well beyond the issue presented and probably beyond his jurisdiction as well. I suspect to the public this case is already part fact and part fiction, but for the dignity of our court system, I would love to see that TV plug pulled.
Labels:
Anna Nicole Smith,
Court TV,
Justice Kennedy
Sunday, February 4, 2007
WHAT? NO SOFT ON CRIME CHARGE?
My conservative, former college roommate wrote to express his enjoyment at reading my blog, but suggested that I should try to be a little less critical and focus on some of the more positive things happening in the world. I conceded to him that my current writings were somewhat motivated by the years of mischaracterization and misinformation that were frequently used to describe my opinions, while I served on the court. Indeed, the same old chestnuts were roasted the day my first blog entry was published. Senator Obama in his new book, The Audacity of Hope, relates an incident where the mere change of a line in a speech about Lincoln brought down the wrath of the conservative world---suggesting that he was comparing himself to Lincoln.
In that same vain, I had intended to write today about the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Cunningham v. California, but I couldn't help but consider what the famous conservative voices would have done to me or any other judge they considered liberal in a decision that overturned the sentence of a man "tried and convicted of the continuous abuse of a child under 14".
But that aside, and following my roommate's advice to look on the bright side, the Cunningham decision, which requires a jury rather than a judge to find facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to enhance a sentence under California law, is a recognition by a number of conservative Justices (including Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Scalia and Thomas) of the continued power and viability of the Sixth Amendment. Their presence in the majority may account for the lack of outcry from the conservative world, its failure to focus on the heinous nature of the crime or charge "soft on crime"---its usual practice when the Constitution serves to protect those charged or guilty as evildoers.
How the decision will play out remains to be seen. Many defendants will not want facts relevant to sentencing only presented during the guilt phase for fear of its spillover effect. Bifurcation may be needed frequently; thus extending the length of trials and jury service.
In that same vain, I had intended to write today about the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Cunningham v. California, but I couldn't help but consider what the famous conservative voices would have done to me or any other judge they considered liberal in a decision that overturned the sentence of a man "tried and convicted of the continuous abuse of a child under 14".
But that aside, and following my roommate's advice to look on the bright side, the Cunningham decision, which requires a jury rather than a judge to find facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to enhance a sentence under California law, is a recognition by a number of conservative Justices (including Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Scalia and Thomas) of the continued power and viability of the Sixth Amendment. Their presence in the majority may account for the lack of outcry from the conservative world, its failure to focus on the heinous nature of the crime or charge "soft on crime"---its usual practice when the Constitution serves to protect those charged or guilty as evildoers.
How the decision will play out remains to be seen. Many defendants will not want facts relevant to sentencing only presented during the guilt phase for fear of its spillover effect. Bifurcation may be needed frequently; thus extending the length of trials and jury service.
Friday, January 19, 2007
WHY WE SHOULD CARE ABOUT THE GUANTANAMO PRISONERS
When law students ask me what was my greatest case in the 25 years that I was a trial lawyer, I tell them that during the 1967 race riots in Newark, New Jersey, a group of lawyers was organized to represent African-Americans who were arrested during the riots, and I was among those who volunteered. I represented a man who had been swept up with a group of rioters and looters, spent 5 days in prison without being able to tell his family where he was, 7 days without legal representation and a total of 15 days before he had a hearing. At the hearing, he testified that at the time he was arrested, 5 A.M. in the morning (during a curfew) he was waiting for a bus---the same bus that he had taken for the last 16 years to go to his job. Although surrounded by the riots and the fires, he did not want to miss a day's work, because he needed the money to support his family. He was acquitted and released. That was my finest hour.
No one suggested to the Newark merchants that they should not do business with the many law firms that were representing the very persons who were charged with burning their stores and looting their merchandise. It would have been unthinkable. This is what lawyers do and did. For us in the legal profession, it was our proudest moment. It is what one dreams about while in law school.
By now everyone has heard and read about the statements by Charles D. Stimson, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for detainee affairs, suggesting that clients should consider ending their ties with law firms that were representing detainees at Guantanamo, the outrage that followed his statements (except from the President) and the purported apology that he offered. But, in truth, despite the outcry over his outlandish threats, no one should be surprised by the statements. They were uttered in a comfort zone and atmosphere which invited them.
The administration has dealt with any and all criticisms of its erosion of civil rights by charging that they are "unpatriotic", "aid or give comfort to the terrorists", or "injure the morale of the troops". Any judge who upholds the constitutional rights of the accused is pounded with being "a liberal", "an activist", or "soft on crime" (an expression that appears 6,720,000 times in a Google search). With an administration that engages in illegal wire- tapping, the unlawful detention of an American citizen, secret foreign prisons, disregard of the Geneva Convention and hints at permissible torture, ignores Congressional oversight and avoids judicial scrutiny for its actions, is it any wonder that one of its officials would feel free and comfortable suggesting that the pro bono representation of suspected terrorists should warrant sanctions from their clients?
There, indeed, may be be some real terrorists imprisoned at Guantanamo, but as we already know, many are there based upon false accusations, acts of personal or tribal vengeance or other misinformation. Many have been released. But no matter what their guilt or innocence, to threaten those who seek to represent them is to repudiate one of the most basic and fundamental rights now recognized in our democracy. Although we all want to wash Mr. Stimson's mouth out with soap, we should remember that the foul language he used---he learned at home---the White House.
No one suggested to the Newark merchants that they should not do business with the many law firms that were representing the very persons who were charged with burning their stores and looting their merchandise. It would have been unthinkable. This is what lawyers do and did. For us in the legal profession, it was our proudest moment. It is what one dreams about while in law school.
By now everyone has heard and read about the statements by Charles D. Stimson, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for detainee affairs, suggesting that clients should consider ending their ties with law firms that were representing detainees at Guantanamo, the outrage that followed his statements (except from the President) and the purported apology that he offered. But, in truth, despite the outcry over his outlandish threats, no one should be surprised by the statements. They were uttered in a comfort zone and atmosphere which invited them.
The administration has dealt with any and all criticisms of its erosion of civil rights by charging that they are "unpatriotic", "aid or give comfort to the terrorists", or "injure the morale of the troops". Any judge who upholds the constitutional rights of the accused is pounded with being "a liberal", "an activist", or "soft on crime" (an expression that appears 6,720,000 times in a Google search). With an administration that engages in illegal wire- tapping, the unlawful detention of an American citizen, secret foreign prisons, disregard of the Geneva Convention and hints at permissible torture, ignores Congressional oversight and avoids judicial scrutiny for its actions, is it any wonder that one of its officials would feel free and comfortable suggesting that the pro bono representation of suspected terrorists should warrant sanctions from their clients?
There, indeed, may be be some real terrorists imprisoned at Guantanamo, but as we already know, many are there based upon false accusations, acts of personal or tribal vengeance or other misinformation. Many have been released. But no matter what their guilt or innocence, to threaten those who seek to represent them is to repudiate one of the most basic and fundamental rights now recognized in our democracy. Although we all want to wash Mr. Stimson's mouth out with soap, we should remember that the foul language he used---he learned at home---the White House.
Labels:
Guantanamo,
pro bono counsel,
right to counsel,
Stimson
Sunday, December 24, 2006
PUNISHMENT BY ACCUSATION
When I was in my early teens my father wrote a letter to the editor of the local weekly newspaper criticizing a report about a local businessman who had been charged in another state with passing a bad check. My father complained that the major newspapers were unlikely to run the story and that it was unfair to give credence to the charges and injure the reputation of the resident until he had been found guilty. The newspaper responded, as one would suspect, about the freedom of the press and the right of the public to know. The charges were eventually dismissed as a case of mistaken identity (and coincidentally, my father became the editor of that same newspaper several years later.)
No one can dispute the right of the newspaper to run that story under the First Amendment. But I had the privilege of being a friend to the late, great Fred Friendly, (former president of CBS News and creator with Edward R. Murrow of See It Now), and he often said:"There is a difference between what you have a right to say and the right thing to say." Which brings me to the now infamous Duke Case. The district attorney in that case may be guilty of other improprieties (N.Y. Times 11/24/06), but I would like to focus on his public pronouncements regarding the case.
In this day and age, it is unlikely, even if the mainstream media chose to institute some self-restraints in publishing criminal charges, that they would not find their way to the public through the Internet. Not so, however, for prosecutors who choose to hold press conferences about indictments. Those who do so forever stigmatize the named defendants, even if the charges are eventually dropped or the defendants are acquitted. Some restraints are imposed upon prosecutors, but they are concerned more with protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial rather than his reputation.
There may be some circumstances in which the publication of charges are in the public interest, such as the apprehension of a serial murderer or rapist who has created fear in a given community. But most announcements by a prosecutor do not serve that function. The defendants in the Duke case may or may not be guilty of some criminal activity. The charges against them may have been made public even absent the pronouncements of the district attorney, but his actions most assuredly guaranteed it.
If these young men are guilty, then the damage to their reputations will have been well-deserved, but if they are not, they will never escape the stigma that has been imposed upon them. That may be the unfortunate and inevitable outcome of our judicial system, but prosecutors would serve the system better by exercising greater restraint in announcing charges and identifying those charged. The time to punish defendants is after they have been convicted not when and merely because they have been charged.
No one can dispute the right of the newspaper to run that story under the First Amendment. But I had the privilege of being a friend to the late, great Fred Friendly, (former president of CBS News and creator with Edward R. Murrow of See It Now), and he often said:"There is a difference between what you have a right to say and the right thing to say." Which brings me to the now infamous Duke Case. The district attorney in that case may be guilty of other improprieties (N.Y. Times 11/24/06), but I would like to focus on his public pronouncements regarding the case.
In this day and age, it is unlikely, even if the mainstream media chose to institute some self-restraints in publishing criminal charges, that they would not find their way to the public through the Internet. Not so, however, for prosecutors who choose to hold press conferences about indictments. Those who do so forever stigmatize the named defendants, even if the charges are eventually dropped or the defendants are acquitted. Some restraints are imposed upon prosecutors, but they are concerned more with protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial rather than his reputation.
There may be some circumstances in which the publication of charges are in the public interest, such as the apprehension of a serial murderer or rapist who has created fear in a given community. But most announcements by a prosecutor do not serve that function. The defendants in the Duke case may or may not be guilty of some criminal activity. The charges against them may have been made public even absent the pronouncements of the district attorney, but his actions most assuredly guaranteed it.
If these young men are guilty, then the damage to their reputations will have been well-deserved, but if they are not, they will never escape the stigma that has been imposed upon them. That may be the unfortunate and inevitable outcome of our judicial system, but prosecutors would serve the system better by exercising greater restraint in announcing charges and identifying those charged. The time to punish defendants is after they have been convicted not when and merely because they have been charged.
Wednesday, December 20, 2006
WARNING: DON"T ATTEND MARY CHENEY'S BABY SHOWER IF YOU WANT TO BE A FEDERAL JUDGE
To all of you who urged me to continue blogging despite the mud-slinging, I express my gratitude. In particular, I was convinced to continue by an e-mail from Lucia Liljegren forwarded to me by my former law clerk, the distinguished law professor and author, Eric Muller. Without your encouragement I would have missed the opportunity to discuss the remarkable opposition stance by Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas to the nomination of Janet Neff, a Michigan state judge, to the Federal District Court.
Let me see if I understand this. So a person is unqualified for the federal bench because she attended a "same-sex commitment ceremony for the daughter of her long-time neighbors." (N.Y. Times 12/19/06) Not presided at, but ATTENDED! But even worse, this "impediment" could be removed by the Faustian bargain of her agreeing to recuse herself from all cases involving same-sex unions! Nothing is more symbolic of the efforts to pervert the federal judiciary than the attempt to impose this condition upon a nominee.
Forget for a moment the insult to the fundamental principle of the separation of powers, and consider the logical application of the Senator's condition. If her mere attendance at this function puts into question her impartiality sufficient to require her recusal in all cases involving same-sex unions, what of the nominee who has witnessed an execution? Is he or she disqualified from hearing all death penalty cases? What of the nominee who regularly attends church services or attends a wedding at a church or synagogue? Must she recuse herself in all cases involving church/state matters? Are former prosecutors or criminal defense counsel barred from hearing all criminal matters? Is the judge who reads the daily newspaper barred from deciding matters which relate to freedom of the press?
I concede that some of these examples are absurd, but so are the Senator's grounds for opposing the nomination and his condition for confirming it (although he indicates that he might oppose it nonetheless). Passive attendance at a celebration certainly should not be a grounds for disqualification to the federal bench; nor should the expression of views on controversial matters. Although some nominees have denied it, do we want judges who have have never considered, spoken or written on such controversial issues as same-sex marriage, abortion, stem cell research, the death penalty, etc. Their positions or views may cause senators to vote for or against their confirmation, but a disqualification or recusal agreement should never be exacted as a condition to confirmation, particularly by a single senator.
The Senator's attempt to mold the judiciary in his own image should give us all pause and concern. It is a sad day for the judiciary and the country when attendance at a friend's celebration is cause for disqualification.
Warning: Don't attend Mary Cheney's baby shower if you want to be a federal judge.
HAPPY NEW YEAR
Let me see if I understand this. So a person is unqualified for the federal bench because she attended a "same-sex commitment ceremony for the daughter of her long-time neighbors." (N.Y. Times 12/19/06) Not presided at, but ATTENDED! But even worse, this "impediment" could be removed by the Faustian bargain of her agreeing to recuse herself from all cases involving same-sex unions! Nothing is more symbolic of the efforts to pervert the federal judiciary than the attempt to impose this condition upon a nominee.
Forget for a moment the insult to the fundamental principle of the separation of powers, and consider the logical application of the Senator's condition. If her mere attendance at this function puts into question her impartiality sufficient to require her recusal in all cases involving same-sex unions, what of the nominee who has witnessed an execution? Is he or she disqualified from hearing all death penalty cases? What of the nominee who regularly attends church services or attends a wedding at a church or synagogue? Must she recuse herself in all cases involving church/state matters? Are former prosecutors or criminal defense counsel barred from hearing all criminal matters? Is the judge who reads the daily newspaper barred from deciding matters which relate to freedom of the press?
I concede that some of these examples are absurd, but so are the Senator's grounds for opposing the nomination and his condition for confirming it (although he indicates that he might oppose it nonetheless). Passive attendance at a celebration certainly should not be a grounds for disqualification to the federal bench; nor should the expression of views on controversial matters. Although some nominees have denied it, do we want judges who have have never considered, spoken or written on such controversial issues as same-sex marriage, abortion, stem cell research, the death penalty, etc. Their positions or views may cause senators to vote for or against their confirmation, but a disqualification or recusal agreement should never be exacted as a condition to confirmation, particularly by a single senator.
The Senator's attempt to mold the judiciary in his own image should give us all pause and concern. It is a sad day for the judiciary and the country when attendance at a friend's celebration is cause for disqualification.
Warning: Don't attend Mary Cheney's baby shower if you want to be a federal judge.
HAPPY NEW YEAR
Wednesday, December 13, 2006
OUTSOURCING TORTURE
Is there anything that will not be condoned in the name of fighting terrorism? Maher Arar, a dual citizen of both Canada and Syria, but a resident of Canada since a teenager, alleges that he was seized by representatives of the United States government at Kennedy Airport, held and then sent to Syria where he was interrogated and tortured. He was eventually released when it was determined that he was not a terrorist. Apparently no one now claims otherwise.
The judiciary has the role and duty of protecting constitutional rights during times of national crisis and war, even to the extent of limiting the power of the executive branch. In such times, the judiciary should be even more vigilant, because it is in such times that our rights are in the greatest jeopardy. President Truman's seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War (on the grounds that a strike would have affected the war effort) was prohibited by the Supreme Court noting that a president cannot elude the restrictions of the Constitution by the assertion of his military role. Likewise, the First Amendment trumped the government's efforts to block the publication of the Pentagon Papers despite the government's assertion of damage to the national security.
Mr. Arar has no other remedy other than his claim for damages. Congress has not explicitly denied the remedy under these circumstances, nor provided any alternative. The government in a formal submission to the United Nations stated that there is no justification or tolerance for torture. So the balancing, if indeed there is a need for it, has already been done. If we condone the outsourcing of torture and fail to provide a remedy for it, then we are no different than the suicide bombers, who also purport to act in furtherance of their foreign policy.
(I wish to disclose that it is my intention to join with other retired judges in filing an amici brief urging a reversal of the dismissal of Mr. Arar's case.)
His suit against certain named U.S. officials for damages under what is known as the Bivens doctrine was dismissed on the grounds of "a special factor" urged by the government that the violation of his rights occurred "during efforts to protect national security and that affected foreign affairs", and that the judiciary was not the branch to balance individual rights against national security. (His lack of U.S. citizenship was not a basis for the dismissal.)
The judiciary was created, in part, to reign in abuses by the other branches if they violated the rights granted to individuals. Hopefully, we do not have to debate in this day and age, that persons here and everywhere have the right to be free from torture. Torture, although practiced in many places, is virtually forbidden everywhere and most certainly violates the Fifth Amendment, our laws and our treaties. So what is the balancing that must take place? Is the argument that forbidding torture or compensating someone who has been tortured under the auspices of or in complicity with our government may somehow run contrary to national security?The judiciary has the role and duty of protecting constitutional rights during times of national crisis and war, even to the extent of limiting the power of the executive branch. In such times, the judiciary should be even more vigilant, because it is in such times that our rights are in the greatest jeopardy. President Truman's seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War (on the grounds that a strike would have affected the war effort) was prohibited by the Supreme Court noting that a president cannot elude the restrictions of the Constitution by the assertion of his military role. Likewise, the First Amendment trumped the government's efforts to block the publication of the Pentagon Papers despite the government's assertion of damage to the national security.
Mr. Arar has no other remedy other than his claim for damages. Congress has not explicitly denied the remedy under these circumstances, nor provided any alternative. The government in a formal submission to the United Nations stated that there is no justification or tolerance for torture. So the balancing, if indeed there is a need for it, has already been done. If we condone the outsourcing of torture and fail to provide a remedy for it, then we are no different than the suicide bombers, who also purport to act in furtherance of their foreign policy.
(I wish to disclose that it is my intention to join with other retired judges in filing an amici brief urging a reversal of the dismissal of Mr. Arar's case.)
Labels:
Arar case,
Bivens,
national security,
torture
Saturday, December 9, 2006
The Constitution and a Trip to the Dentist
This is my first entry in to the world of blog, because I am astonished by the lack of outrage over the case of Jose Padilla---an American citizen who has been held in solitary confinement for 31/2 years, been deprived of the right to counsel for 21 months, all as a result of the unfettered discretion of the President in designating Mr Padilla as an "enemy combatant". The N.Y. Times (12/4/06) reported that during a recent trip to the dentist, Mr. Padilla's legs were shackled, his wrists cuffed and "noise-blocking headphones placed over his ears and blacked-out goggles over his eyes".
Mr. Padilla was originally arrested and publicly charged with plotting a dirty bomb attack in the United States. He was eventually charged with conspiracy and of providing material support to terrorists. The recent indictment was not in recognition of his constitutional rights as an American citizen, but rather a strategic decision by the administration to avoid what undoubtedly would have been an adverse judicial decision condemning the confinement and treatment of Mr. Padilla. The alleged dirty bomb plot is nowhere mentioned in the indictment against him. Mr. Padilla may be guilty of something, but the administration is guilty of far worse.
The administration has justified (and to large extent the public has accepted) wiretapping, these detentions, and possibly even torture, on the basis that these methods fight terrorism and confine terrorists. But what if they are not terrorists? Hundreds have been released after extended confinement without charges. They are all someone's husband, son, brother or father. For many such persons, the government has now suspended habeas corpus ("the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom" Justice Chase, 1868), thus denying the means and opportunity for those detained to establish their innocence of any wrongdoing.
American soldiers are dying to win freedom for the people of Iraq, while we are losing freedom for the people of America.
Mr. Padilla was originally arrested and publicly charged with plotting a dirty bomb attack in the United States. He was eventually charged with conspiracy and of providing material support to terrorists. The recent indictment was not in recognition of his constitutional rights as an American citizen, but rather a strategic decision by the administration to avoid what undoubtedly would have been an adverse judicial decision condemning the confinement and treatment of Mr. Padilla. The alleged dirty bomb plot is nowhere mentioned in the indictment against him. Mr. Padilla may be guilty of something, but the administration is guilty of far worse.
The administration has justified (and to large extent the public has accepted) wiretapping, these detentions, and possibly even torture, on the basis that these methods fight terrorism and confine terrorists. But what if they are not terrorists? Hundreds have been released after extended confinement without charges. They are all someone's husband, son, brother or father. For many such persons, the government has now suspended habeas corpus ("the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom" Justice Chase, 1868), thus denying the means and opportunity for those detained to establish their innocence of any wrongdoing.
American soldiers are dying to win freedom for the people of Iraq, while we are losing freedom for the people of America.
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